RoPFI
Regulation of Political Finance Indicator
William C R Horncastle
Publications
This page contains links to known publications that have used the RoPFI data. If you would like to add a publication to this list, please complete the form on the contact page.
2023: Competition, Scandal, or Ideology? A Congruence Analysis of Australian Political Finance Reforms (1980–2020)
Abstract
Although studies into political finance reform have become commonplace, many questions remain unanswered in this area. Studies into links between scandals and political finance reform have provided conflicting findings, while little is known about why incumbents force through self-serving reforms in some instances, but cooperate with rivals in others. The ‘General Theory of Campaign Finance Reform’ reconciles inconsistencies by situating reform processes within the context of party competition. Observing that this framework has not yet been empirically tested, this study undertakes a Congruence Analysis to apply the model to a forty-year period of Australian political finance reform. Hansard is used to document inter-party interactions, in conjunction with quantitative indicators of party competition, organization, and ideology, which outline the changing contexts of reform. Findings indicate that party competition, scandals, and changes in incumbency are influential drivers of reform, while ideological factors play an inconsistent role. Providing insights into causal processes of reform, this article bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical literature on political finance.
Citation
Horncastle, W C R. (2023) 'Competition, Scandal, or Ideology? A Congruence Analysis of Australian Political Finance Reforms (1980-2020)', Party Politics, Forthcoming.
2023: Referendum campaign financing by political parties: the case of the United Kingdom
Abstract
The literature on the political finance of referendum campaigns has focussed primarily on how these are regulated in individual countries, but scholarly work is yet to empirically explore how these regulations and other factors translate into concrete spending practices of political parties. This article attempts to do this for the United Kingdom (UK), which has one of the oldest and most extensive referendum political finance regimes, with the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA). After formulating several hypotheses grounded in party behaviour and political finance literature, we offer a close examination of the PPERA’s regulations on referendum campaign finance and compare the expenditure patterns of UK political parties in five post-PPERA referendums. The findings suggest that the competitiveness of a referendum, as well as a party’s financial resources and the salience of the referendum topic for the party are possible explanations for their financial engagement in the referendum campaign. More surprisingly, our results show that expenditure limits imposed by the PPERA barely have an effect on party expenditure. Parties rarely come close to the limits imposed, but when they do bump up against the limit, they are able to circumvent this via donations, which do not count towards their spending cap.
Citation
Paulissen, T. and Maddens, B. (2023) 'Referendum campaign financing by political parties: the case of the United Kingdom', Political Science, Online First. https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2023.2238715
2022: Model based clustering of political finance regimes: Developing the regulation of political finance indicator (Open Access)
Abstract
Political finance literature lacks a common framework for classifying regulatory systems. As these tools are influential in the identification of generalizable relationships, studies assessing political finance in areas such as corruption, competition, and electoral outcomes, often present case specific findings. Using updated International IDEA data, the application of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Model Based Clustering framework presents a variable to measure levels of regulation; the ‘Unregulated’, ‘Partially Regulated’ and ‘Strongly Regulated’ system types; and statistics for assessing the certainty of each country’s classification. Applying this methodology to a 180-country sample represents an improvement on previous studies which, due to data limitations, have often used reductive methods and limited sampling. In closing, the ‘Regulation of Political Finance Indicator’ is introduced via Multinomial Logistic Regression, where analyses from prior literature are revisited. Avenues for further study are provided, which may seek to identify generalizable relationships in the areas described above, while also looking to produce ongoing panel data.
Citation
Horncastle, W C R. (2022) 'Model based clustering of political finance regimes: Developing the regulation of political finance indicator', Electoral Studies, Vol. 79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102524